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Introduction 
This article addresses an open problem in the area of cognitive systems 
and architectures: namely the problem of handling (in terms of process-
ing and reasoning capabilities) complex knowledge structures that can be 
at least plausibly comparable, both in terms of size and of typology of 
the encoded information, to the knowledge that humans process daily for 
executing everyday activities.  
Handling a huge amount of knowledge, and selectively retrieve it ac-
cording to the needs emerging in different situational scenarios, is an 
important aspect of human intelligence. For this task, in fact, humans 
adopt a wide range of heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd) due to their 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1957). In this perspective, one of the re-
quirements that should be considered for the design, the realization and 
the evaluation of intelligent cognitively-inspired systems should be rep-
resented by their ability of heuristically identify and retrieve, from the 
general knowledge stored in their artificial Long Term Memory (LTM), 
that one which is synthetically and contextually relevant. This require-
ment, however, is often neglected. Currently, artificial cognitive systems 
and architectures are not able, de facto, to deal with complex knowledge 
structures that can be even slightly comparable to the knowledge heuris-
tically managed by humans. In this paper I will argue that this is not only 
a technological problem but also an epistemological one and I will 
briefly sketch a proposal for a possible solution.  
1.1 The Knowledge Problem  
As mentioned, current cognitive artificial systems and cognitive archi-
tectures are not equipped with knowledge bases comparable with the 
conceptual knowledge that humans possess and use in the everyday life. 
From an epistemological perspective this lack represents a problem: in 
fact, endowing cognitive agents with more “realistic” knowledge bases, 
in terms of both the size and the type of information encoded, would 
allow, at least in principle, to test the different artificial systems in situa-
tions closer to that one encountered by humans in real-life.  
This problem becomes more relevant if we take into account the Cogni-
tive Architectures (Newell, 1990). While “cognitively-inspired systems”, 
in fact, could be designed to deal with only domain-specific information 
(e.g. let us think to a computer simulator of a poker player), Cognitive 
Architectures, on the other hand, have also the goal and the general ob-
jective of testing  - computationally - the general models of mind they 
implement.  
Therefore: if such architectures only process a simplistic amount (and a 
limited typology) of knowledge, the structural mechanisms that they 
implement concerning knowledge processing tasks (e.g. that ones of 
retrieval, learning, reasoning etc.) can be only loosely evaluated, and 
compared w.r.t. that ones used by humans in similar knowledge-intensive 
tasks. In other words: from an epistemological perspective, the explana-
tory power of their computational simulation is strongly affected (Min-
kowski, 2013). 
1.2 The “Knowledge Limit” of Cognitive Architectures 
The design and adaptation of cognitive architectures is a wide and active 
area of research in Cognitive Science, Artificial Intelligence and, more 
recently, in the area of Computational Neuroscience. Cognitive architec-
tures have been historically introduced i) “to capture, at the computa-
tional level, the invariant mechanisms of human cognition, including 
those underlying the functions of control, learning, memory, adaptivity, 
perception and action” (Oltramari and Lebiere, 2012) and ii) to reach 
human level intelligence, also called AGI (Artificial General Intelli-
gence), by means of the realization of artificial artifacts built upon them. 
During the last decades many cognitive architectures have been realized, 
- such as ACT-R (Andersson et al. 2004), SOAR (Laird 2008) etc. - and 
have been widely tested in several cognitive tasks involving learning, 
reasoning, selective attention, recognition etc. However, they are general 
structures without a general content.  
Thus, every evaluation of systems relying upon them is necessarily task-
specific and do not involve not even the minimum part of the full spec-
trum of processes involved in the human cognition when the “knowl-
edge” comes to play a role. This means that the knowledge embedded in 
such architectures is usually ad-hoc built, domain specific, or based on 
the particular tasks they have to deal with. Such limitation, however, do 
not provide any advancement in the cognitive research about how the 
humans heuristically select and deal with the huge and variegated 
amount of knowledge they possess when they have to: make decisions, 
reason about a given situation or, more in general, solve a particular cog-
nitive task involving several dimensions of analysis.  
This problem, as a consequence, also limits the advancement of the re-
search in the area of Artificial General Intelligence. The “knowledge” 
limit of the cognitive architectures has been recently pointed out in liter-
ature (Oltramari and Lebiere 2012) and some technical solutions for fill-
ing this “knowledge gap” has been proposed. In particular the use of 
ontologies and of semantic formalisms has been seen as a possible solu-
tion for providing effective content to the structural knowledge modules 
of the cognitive architectures. Some initial efforts have been done in this 
sense. In particular, within the MindEye project, the ACT-R architecture 
developed at the Carnegie Mellon University has been “semantically 
extended” with the ontological content coming from three integrated 
semantic resources composed by the lexical databases WordNet (Fell-
baum 1998), FrameNet and by a branch of the top level ontology 
DOLCE (Masolo et al. 2003) related to the event modelling. However, 
also in this case, the amount of semantic knowledge selected for the real-
ization of the Cognitive Engine (one of the systems developed within the 
MindEye Program), and for its evaluation, was tailored on the specific 
needs of the system itself. It, in fact, was aimed at solving a precise task 
of event recognition trough a video-surveillance intelligent machinery; 
therefore only the ontological knowledge about the “events” was selec-
tively embedded in it.  
2 A Distributed Approach: Heterogeneous Knowledge Frameworks 
in the Linked Data Ecosystem 
Despite the importance of these first attempts aimed at connecting on-
tologies and cognitive architectures, this approach still present problems 
within the research program aimed at achieving an effective Artificial 
General Intelligence (AGI) since both in terms of “size” and in terms of 
“types of encoded knowledge” the problems mentioned above still per-
sist. On the other hand, a viable solution able to promote an effective 
extension and adoption of semantic content within the cognitive archi-
tectures should go beyond the integration of standard symbolic knowl-
edge represented in semantic format.  In particular, differently from what 
has been already proposed, the solution defended in this paper does not 
suggest to connect single ontologies to the knowledge modules of the 
cognitive architectures. It is based, on the other hand, on the idea of con-
necting multiple and heterogeneous knowledge spaces and frameworks 
to the available knowledge modules of the cognitive architectures. The 
proposed approach is somehow related to a recent research trend, devel-
oped within the Semantic Web research community, known as Linked 
Data (Bizer et al. 2009).  
Following this view, in recent years, a huge amount of semantic data 
(released in standard semantic web languages such as RDF) has been 
published on the web (as “knowledge bubbles” or “knowledge end-
points”), linked and integrated together with other “knowledge 
endpoint”. The ultimate goal of such linkage has been that one of creat-
ing a unified semantic knowledge space available in a machine readable 
format. Famous examples of such interconnected “knowledge bubbles” 
are DBpedia (the semantic version of Wikipedia, in RDF). 
The main technical advantage coming from this integration is represent-
ed by the possibility of using such linked knowledge as an effective al-
ternative to the standard solution based on the equipment of cognitive 
architectures with monolithic pieces of, ad hoc, selected ontological 
knowledge used for solving specific problems. On the other hand, such 
knowledge space allows, at least in principle, the technical possibility of 
encoding, for the first time, a general linked knowledge within a general 
cognitive architecture.  
The integration with the “world-level knowledge” (see Salvucci, 2014) 
by means of external knowledge sources is, however, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for solving the problem of the “knowledge level” in 
Cognitive Architectures since it only deals with the “size” aspect. One of 
the main problems of the “knowledge-bubbles” encoded in the Linked 
Data perspective is, in fact, represented by its homogeneity: i.e. only 
one part of the whole spectrum of conceptual informations is encoded in 
this kind of symbolic based representations (usually the so called “clas-
sical” part: that one representing concepts in terms of necessary and suf-
ficient information, see Frixione and Lieto, 2012 on these aspects). On 
the other hand, the so called “common-sense” conceptual components 
(i.e. those that, based on the notions developed in the experimental and 
theoretical cognitive sciences, allow to characterize concepts in terms of 
“prototypes”, “exemplars” or “theories”, see Frixione and Lieto, 2013; 
and Frixione and Lieto, 2014 for further details) is largely absent in such 
framework. Common-sense conceptual knowledge, however, is exactly 
the type of “cognitive information” crucially used by humans for heuris-
tic reasoning and decision making.  
Given this state of affairs, a viable solution for achieving an effective 
simulation of human-level conceptual representation and processing, 
would require to endow the knowledge ecosystem of the Linked Data 
approach with a heterogeneous perspective to the representation of 
conceptual knowledge. In particular: it would be necessary to introduce 
conceptual frameworks able to represent the information not only in 
symbolic and classical logic-oriented fashion but also in a common-
sense one. A suitable solution for the representation (and reasoning) of 
common sense knowledge is represented by the Peter Gärdenfors’s pro-
posal of Conceptual Spaces (Gärdenfors, 2014). In such framework at 
least prototypical and exemplars-based representations (and their corre-
sponding reasoning mechanisms) can be naturally represented. A further 
argument supporting this framework as a good candidate for an extended 
heterogeneous Linked Data ecosystem (LDe) is the existence of a XML-
like Conceptual Space mark-up language (CSML) that could be easily 
extendable towards the RDF language (the standard adopted within the 
Linked Data community) .  1
Summing up: in this paper I have tried to briefly present (the brevity is 
due to the lack of space) two main epistemological problems affecting 
the knowledge level in the Cognitive Architectures. After detailing the 
problems I have suggested that, from a technical perspective, the adop-
tion of a hetereogeneous representational approach, within the LDe, 
could allow to deal with both the “size” argument and with that one con-
cerning the “typology" of the encoded knowledge, thus providing at least 
in principle, a possible solution concerning the current epistemological 
limitations of the knowledge level in cognitive architectures. Within the 
family of the approaches claiming for the need of representational het-
erogeneity for the conceptual knowledge, the idea of representing con-
ceptual structures as “heterogeneous proxytypes” (see Lieto, 2014) 
seems to be particularly feasible for providing the integration between 
the heterogeneous representational level and the corresponding reason-
ing procedures embedded in general purpose Cognitive Architectures 
(due to the lack of space I remind the interested reader to the references 
indicated above and below for an introduction to the mentioned ap-
proach). The first systems designed according to such approach, and 
integrated with existing Cognitive Architectures, have obtained, in fact, 
encouraging results in task of conceptual categorization and retrieval if 
compared with humans answers (on these aspects see Lieto et al. 2015; 
Lieto et al. forthcoming). Additional investigations are, however, needed 
(and represent ongoing work) in order to deeply evaluate the efficacy of 
the proposed approach in more challenging scenarios. 
 Of course, other frameworks oriented towards the representation of additional kinds 1
of “common-sense” knowledge (e.g. that one hypothesized within the “theory-
theory”) could be introduced as well in order to enhance the variety of knowledge 
usable by a cognitive agent whose behaviour and processes are controlled within the 
framework of a Cognitive Architecture.
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